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PROBATE-SATISFYING THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF AC-
TUAL NOTICE TO ESTATE CREDITORS. Tulsa Professional Collection
Services v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
H. Everett Pope, Jr. entered St. John Medical Center in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, in November 1978, and remained there until his death on
April 2, 1979. JoAnne Pope, his wife, opened an estate pursuant to
Oklahoma's probate code.' As executrix of the estate, she followed
the code provisions which required her to "immediately give notice to
creditors."' 2 The method used to inform creditors consisted of pub-
lishing a notice in a local newspaper for two consecutive weeks.
St. John Medical Center assigned its claim for expenses related to
Mr. Pope's illness to its subsidiary, Tulsa Professional Collection
Services. Neither the medical center nor the subsidiary filed a claim
within the statutory period.3 After the claim period expired, the col-
lection agency filed an Application for Order Compelling Payment of
Expenses of Last Illness.4 The district court denied this application.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, rejecting
the collection agency's argument that the nonclaim statute's 5 notice
provisions violated due process. The Oklahoma Supreme Court,6 in a
subsequent review, also rejected this argument. The United States
Supreme Court reversed.7 The Court held that due process requires
estates to give actual notice to creditors by mail or other means cer-
tain to ensure actual notice that their claims must be filed or be barred
by the nonclaim statute. For known or reasonably ascertainable cred-
itors of an estate, notice by publication is insufficient to afford due
1. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 58, §§ 1-963 (West 1981).
2. Every personal representative must, immediately after his appointment, give no-
tice to the creditors of the deceased ... requiring all persons having claims against
said deceased to present the same ... within two (2) months from the date of the first
publication of said notice; such notice must be published in some newspaper in said
county once each week for two (2) consecutive weeks.
Id. § 331.
3. The statutory period is two months from the date of first publication. Id.
4. Id. § 594.
5. Nonclaim statutes "fix a definite time limit within which claims against decedents
must be proceeded upon; their purpose is to provide relief against uncertainty in the late asser-
tion of claims and to facilitate the speedy settlement of estates." T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF WILLS § 127, at 690 (2d ed. 1953).
6. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 733 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1986).
7. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1348 (1988).
The decision was 8-1, with Chief Justice William Rehnquist dissenting.
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process. Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340
(1988).
In 1950 the United States Supreme Court decided Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. I which established that notice and
a hearing satisfying the standards of due process must accompany
state action affecting property.9 "An elementary and fundamental re-
quirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.""0
In Mullane the Court struck down state banking legislation"1
regulating the administration of trust estates. The statute permitted
notice by publication as the sole means of informing known trust ben-
eficiaries of an action that would settle their rights against the trustee
of a common trust fund. In essence, the Court held that publication
notice violated the due process clause 2 when the beneficiaries' names
and addresses were known to the trustee or could be ascertained by
the exercise of reasonable diligence. I3 "The statutory notice to known
beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach every-
one, but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calcu-
lated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at
hand."'I4
Traditionally, whether the notice was sufficient depended upon
the court's labeling the proceeding in rem 5 or in personam. 16 In per-
sonam jurisdiction required personal service or other notice equally
effective in reaching the interested party.' 7 However, constructive no-
tice by publication generally satisfied due process requirements for in
8. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
9. Id. at 313. See generally Annotation, Validity of Nonclaim Statute or Rule Provision
for Notice by Publication to Claimants Against Estate-Post 1950 Cases, 56 A.L.R. 4th 458, 461
(1987).
10. 339 U.S. at 314.
11. Id. at 309. The legislation affected was former N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-C(12)
(1944).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
13. 339 U.S. at 318.
14. Id. at 319.
15. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (jurisdiction in in rem proceeding is based
on court's power over land).
16. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (in personam jurisdiction is based on state's
authority over defendant's person).
17. Id. at 734. Due process requires appearance or personal service before judgment is
personally binding.
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rem proceedings."8 In Mullane the Supreme Court abandoned the
historical dichotomy between notice for in rem and in personam pro-
ceedings19 and established a balancing test to determine the suffi-
ciency of notice. This test weighed the state's administrative interest
against the individual's interest in receiving notice of the
proceeding.2"
Despite language in Mullane suggesting a holding limited to the
particular facts of the case,2 the United States Supreme Court has
applied the Mullane balancing test in various factual situations. In
1953 the Supreme Court held that as to a potential claim in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, publication notice was inadequate to inform a
known creditor that its claim would be barred if not filed within the
statutory period.22
The next application of Mullane occurred three years later when
the Court ruled that notice of condemnation proceedings published in
a local newspaper was not sufficient for a landowner whose name the
city knew because it was on the official records.23 The Court further
extended the Mullane doctrine in Schroeder v. City of New York,24
concluding that publication in a newspaper and posted notices were
inadequate to apprise a property owner of condemnation proceedings
when his name and address were readily ascertainable from both deed
records and tax rolls.
The United States Supreme Court continued the trend expanding
Mullane's actual notice requirement in Mennonite Board of Missions
v. Adams.25  Mennonite involved the constitutionality of Indiana's
statutory scheme 26 for the annual sale of real property on which pay-
ments of property taxes were delinquent for five months or longer.27
18. Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559, 564 (1889) (publication
of notice satisfies due process of law in in rem cases).
19. 339 U.S. at 312.
20. Id. at 314.
21. Id. at 312. The Court stated that it had:
not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between these interests in a
particular proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be utilized or
what test it must meet. Personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded
as indispensable to the process due .... We disturb none of the established rules on
these subjects.
Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
22. City of New York v. New York, N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
23. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
24. 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
25. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
26. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1.1-24-1 to 1-24-12 (Bums 1984).
27. 462 U.S. at 792-93.
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The statute provided for notice by certified mail to the property
owner,2" but had no provision for notice to mortgagees.
Elkhart County, Indiana, initiated proceedings to sell property
mortgaged by Moore to the Mennonite Board of Missions (MBM).29
The county provided notice as required under the statute by posting
and publishing an announcement of the tax sale and mailing notice by
certified mail to Moore, the mortgagor. Neither the county nor
Moore notified MBM of the pending tax sale.30 Despite the published
notice, MBM never received actual notice of the sale.3' After expira-
tion of the two year redemption period, Adams, the purchaser of
Moore's property at the tax sale, applied for a deed to the property.
He then initiated an action to quiet title.3 2 MBM opposed Adams'
suit to quiet title by contending that it had not received constitution-
ally adequate notice of the pending tax sale and of the opportunity to
redeem the property following the tax sale.3 3
The trial court granted summary judgment to Adams,34 effec-
tively extinguishing MBM's lien on the property. 35 The Indiana
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment,36 reasoning that due process
did not require actual notice to mortgagees because most mortgagees
are sophisticated lenders and should keep accurate records of their
mortgagors' obligations.37
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case.31 When a publicly recorded mortgage identifies the mortgagee,
mailed notice or personal service on the mortgagee must supplement
publication notice.39 Constructive notice to a known mortgagee will
not satisfy the mandate of Mullane.' Notice to the property owner
will not necessarily lead to actual notice to the mortgagee.4' The
county's use of less reliable forms of notice is not reasonable where
"an inexpensive and efficient mechanism such as mail service is avail-
28. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-24-4 (Bums 1984).
29. 462 U.S. at 794.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 795.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-1.1-25-4(d) (Bums 1984) (tax deed vests fee simple title free and
clear of all liens).
36. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
37. Id. at 690.
38. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983).
39. Id. at 798.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 799.
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able."42 Mailed notice or other means as certain to ensure actual no-
tice is a constitutional prerequisite to any proceeding which "will
adversely affect the liberty or property interest of any party. '43
The Supreme Court cases decided after Mullane limited the situ-
ations in which publication notice alone is constitutionally adequate. 44
However, no court had construed Mullane's actual notice require-
ment to apply to creditors of a decedent. The Kansas Court of Ap-
peals45 emphasized that in the probate creditor context, no property
rights are brought before a court for adjudication.4 6 "The notice
under the nonclaim statute.., does not make a creditor a party to the
proceeding, but merely notifies him that he may become one if he
wishes. It does no more than put into operation a special statute of
limitations. 47
The difference between an adjudication of property rights, to
which Mullane applies, and a statute of limitations, to which Mullane
does not apply4 was further developed in an opinion by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court. In a 1981 case, 49 that court reasoned that Mul-
lane did not apply to a creditor's probate claim because his claim was
cut off by operation of a statute of limitation and not by action of a
judicial body." "The bar created by operation of a statute of limita-
tions is established independently of any adjudicatory process."51
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether its notice provi-
sion allowing publication notice to estate creditors violated due pro-
cess in Continental Insurance Co. v. Moseley (Moseley 1).52 In Moseley
I the executrix of the estate had actual knowledge of the creditor's
claim against the estate because there was a pending civil action. 3
However, the executrix simply followed the state's requirement of no-
tice by publication and took no other measures to notify the creditor
42. Id. (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982)).
43. Id. at 800.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
45. Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 2 Kan. App. 2d 506, 582 P.2d 742 (1978).
See also Kuether, Is Kansas Probate Non Claim Statute Unconstitutional. 54 J. KAN. BAR
ASS'N 115, 118 (1985).
46. 2 Kan. App. 2d at 509, 582 P.2d at 744 (quoting New York Merch. Co. v. Stout, 43
Wash. 2d 825, 827-28, 264 P.2d 863, 864 (1953)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. In re Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis. 2d 437, 302 N.W.2d 414 (1981).
50. Id. at 450, 302 N.W.2d at 420.
51. Id.
52. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 98 Nev. 476, 653 P.2d 158 (1982), vacated and re-
manded, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983).
53. Moseley, 98 Nev. at 477, 653 P.2d at 159.
6071988-89]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
insurance company. 4 The creditor received notice of the decedent's
death on the last day for filing claims against her estate."s However,
the creditor did not file its claim until two days after the claim period
expired.5 6 The court denied the claim on the ground that it was not
timely filed. 57
Continental Insurance Company appealed, contending that pub-
lication notice to creditors was insufficient under constitutional stan-
dards of procedural due process.5 Applying the principles of
Mullane to these circumstances, the Nevada court concluded that
published notice pursuant to the Nevada statute was reasonably and
sufficiently calculated to provide actual notice to creditors. 9 Further-
more, the insurance company actually did receive notice within the
statutory nonclaim period, although it was on the last day for filing
claims.6° In barring the creditor's claim, the Moseley I court empha-
sized the state's interest in the efficient and expedient administration
of estates.6'
The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in
connection with Moseley I and vacated the Nevada court's opinion,
remanding the case62 for further consideration in light of Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams,63 decided a week earlier. On remand, the
Nevada Supreme Court reversed its earlier holding in Continental In-
surance Co. v. Moseley (Moseley I1).61 The court quoted Mullane's
"elementary and fundamental requirement of due process" 65 language
and stated: "Given the facts of this case and the holdings in Mennon-
ite and Mullane, we conclude that more than service by publication
was required in order to afford due process to appellant. '66
54. Id. The notice was published in the newspaper for three consecutive weeks.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. The court denied the insurance company's motion to compel republication and
declared the claim forever barred.
58. Id. Continental contended that mere compliance with the statutory notice provision
did not satisfy due process.
59. Id. at 478, 653 P.2d at 160.
60. Id. The insurance company did not file its claim until two days after expiration of the
claims period.
61. Id. Publication notice provides an expeditious and comparatively unencumbered
means of accomplishing estate administration.
62. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 1202 (1983) (mem. opinion).
63. 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
64. 100 Nev. 70, 683 P.2d 20 (1984) (Moseley II).
65. Id. at 71, 683 P.2d at 21 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, 314).
66. Id.
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Despite the holding of Moseley II, many state courts67 were not
willing to concede that the doctrine requiring more notice than that
afforded by publication should be applied to notice under nonclaim
statutes.68 The Missouri Supreme Court said that the Supreme
Court's procedure-granting certiorari, vacating and remanding for
further consideration in light of Mennonite--did not conclusively in-
dicate that the Supreme Court held, or will hold, Mullane applicable
to probate cases. 69 Furthermore, after considering the Mennonite
case, the Missouri court was not persuaded by Moseley II.70
A year later the Illinois Court of Appeals considered whether
estate creditors were entitled to actual notice.7' They agreed with the
Missouri Supreme Court.72 Gibbs v. Estate of Dolan held that the sec-
tion of the probate code providing for notice by publication to estate
creditors was not facially invalid because it did not deprive creditors
of their property without due process of law.73
In 1987 the Kansas Supreme Court joined the Missouri and Illi-
nois courts in disagreeing with Moseley II.7  They held that the
state's nonclaim statute was a statute of limitations and not an adjudi-
cation of rights.75 Therefore, it was not unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the due process rights of a known creditor. 6 The court further
reasoned that to require a decedent's personal representative to "give
actual notice to all 'known or reasonably ascertainable creditors'
would not only be time-consuming, but extremely difficult to adminis-
ter."'77 This burden would defeat the state's interest in seeking speedy
resolutions of decedents' estates. 8
In Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope79 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority,80 analyzed the creditor's interest
at stake in a probate proceeding. The creditor possesses nothing more
67. See, e.g., Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc).
68. Id. at 88.
69. Id. at 87 n.2.
70. Id.
71. Gibbs v. Estate of Dolan, 146 Ill. App. 3d 203, 496 N.E.2d 1126 (1986).
72. Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, 700 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1985).
73. Dolan, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 208, 496 N.E.2d at 1130.
74. Estate of Madden v. Union Pac. R.R., 241 Kan. 414, 736 P.2d 940 (1987).
75. Id. at 423, 736 P.2d at 947.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
80. It is interesting to note that Justice O'Connor, who authored the dissent in Mennonite,
relied largely upon the reasoning of that case in writing the Pope majority opinion.
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than a cause of action against the estate flowing from an unpaid debt.
The Court, applying Mullane, concluded that such a cause of action
nevertheless constituted an intangible property interest entitled to
protection by the fourteenth amendment.8  However, this constitu-
tional protection exists only to shield the interest at stake from a dep-
rivation caused by state action. 2 State action does not occur merely
because private parties make use of "state sanctioned private remedies
or procedures. '8 3 Nor does the tolling of a statute of limitation set by
state law rise to the level of state action." However, state action may
exist when private parties use state procedures with substantial aid
from state officials.8 5
The Court found significant state action in probating an estate.86
"The probate court is intimately involved throughout, and without
that involvement the time bar is never activated. The nonclaim stat-
ute becomes operative only after probate proceedings have been com-
menced in state court. The court must appoint the executor ...
before notice, which triggers the time bar, can be given."'8 7 The state
court's "involvement is so pervasive and substantial that it must be
considered state action subject to the restrictions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8 8
Nonclaim statutes are a special statute of limitations applicable
only to creditors' claims against estates.8 9 These statutes control the
time period in which claims can be filed and by their authority act to
bar forever claims presented after the statutory period has run.9" If
creditors fail to timely file their claims, the nonclaim statute operates
to "terminate their property interests."'" Although the tolling of the
statute does not itself serve to judge the merits of the creditor's claim,
the Court stated that "[i]t is not necessary for a proceeding to directly
adjudicate the merits of a claim in order to 'adversely affect' that
interest."'92
81. 108 S. Ct. at 1344-45.
82. Id. at 1345.
83. Id. (citing Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)).
84. Id. (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)).
85. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)).
86. Id. at 1345.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1346.
89. See supra note 5.
90. 108 S. Ct. at 1346.
91. Id.
92. Id. For example, in Mennonite, "the tax sale proceedings did not address the merits
of the mortgagee's claim." Id.
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The nonclaim periods are relatively short.9 3 Often it is difficult,
if not impossible, for creditors to discover a debtor's death and file
their claims before expiration of the nonclaim period. This fact is
especially true where the creditor's sole means of finding out about
the death and subsequent opening of the estate is a notice published in
a newspaper in the county where the decedent resided.94 The Court
also believed that an executor who stood to benefit from the estate
might be hesitant to encourage creditors to file claims which would
effectively reduce his share of the estate.95 The Court concluded that
consideration of these factors pointed to a "substantial practical need
for actual notice [to estate creditors]. 96
The Court performed a balancing test weighing the need for ac-
tual notice to creditors against the state's interest in the speedy resolu-
tion of probate cases. The Court decided that "providing actual
notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors.., is not incon-
sistent with the goals reflected in nonclaim statutes." 9 The giving of
actual notice should not impose a substantial burden upon estate ad-
ministration. "We have repeatedly recognized that mail service is an
inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to
provide actual notice."9
The nonclaim statute acts in conjunction with the probate pro-
ceedings to "adversely affect" a creditor's property interest. 99 There-
fore, the Court concluded that if a creditor's identity "was known or
'reasonably ascertainable,' then the due process clause requires . . .
notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice.""
Justice Rehnquist dissented,101 objecting to the majority's char-
acterization of the probate court's involvement as state action.0 2
93. For example, in Arkansas the claim period is three months. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-
50-101(a) (1987).
94. 108 S. Ct. at 1347. "As the Court noted in Mullane, '[c]hance alone brings to the
attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a
newspaper.'" Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (citing Mennonite, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455
(1982)).
99. Id. at 1348.
100. Id. A requirement of actual notice to creditors is not so burdensome that it will delay
the promptness with which probate proceedings are conducted.
101. Id.
102. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the majority did not make clear why there is
state action in this case. "[It] remains a mystery which is in no way elucidated by the court's
opinion." Id. at 1349 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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"The 'intimate involvement' of the Probate Court in the present case
was entirely of an administrative nature." 0 a There is virtually mean-
ingless state involvement in the probate context and it is wrong that
such action, or lack of it, is held dispositive.' °4
The Pope holding reflects an important extension of the doctrine
enunciated in Mullane. It not only makes Mullane directly applicable
to probate proceedings, but it also imposes a strict requirement on an
executor to make "reasonably diligent efforts" to uncover the identi-
ties of estate creditors and to serve them with some form of actual
notice. 0 5 "We do not.believe that requiring adherence to such a stan-
dard will be so burdensome or impracticable as to warrant reliance on
publication notice alone.""
The holding in Pope requires states to reevaluate their nonclaim
statutes to assure compliance with due process requirements. 17 In
1987 Arkansas amended its probate code'0 8 to require personal ser-
vice on estate creditors. This amendment resulted from the Mennon-
ite' °9 and Moseley" ° decisions and was made in anticipation of
Pope. "'1
While the amended Arkansas statute contains an actual notice
provision for estate creditors," 12 it still does not go far enough to fully
embrace the requirements established in Pope."3 A bill to amend the
statute is being drafted for presentation to the legislature in January
1989. 11 The proposed amendment seeks to increase the nonclaim pe-
riod from three to six months and attempts to guide the personal rep-
resentative and the estate's attorney in determining which creditors
103. Id. at 1349.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1347.
106. Id. "Notice by mail is already routinely provided at several points in the probate
process." Id.
107. W. McGOVERN, S. KURTZ AND J. REIN, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 14.9, at
692 (West 1988).
108. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-111 (Supp. 1987).
109. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
110. Continental Ins. Co. v. Moseley, 463 U.S. 1202 (1987).
111. Legislative commentary preceding ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-111. See infra note 114.
112. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-111 (a)(4) (Supp. 1987) provides that "[w]ithin one (1)
month after the first publication of the notice, a copy of the notice shall also be served upon...
all unpaid creditors whose name, status as creditors, and addresses are known to the personal
representative, in accordance with § 28-1-112(b)(l), (2), or (3)."
113. As written, the statute does not define the extent of diligence required of a personal
representative to locate creditors, nor does it guide one in identifying the "reasonably ascer-
tainable" creditors. Id.
114. Interview with William Haught, senior partner at Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, Attor-
neys at Law, in Little Rock, Arkansas (September 27, 1988).
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are reasonably ascertainable and what efforts are required to discover
estate creditors. There is also a provision which places the burden on
the creditor to prove that he was reasonably ascertainable.' "
The drafting of this proposed amendment is complicated because
the Supreme Court neglected to define "reasonably diligent efforts"" 1
6
and "reasonably ascertainable creditors,"" 7 presumably leaving the
interpretation of these terms to the discretion of state legislatures and
courts.
California is the first state to amend its probate code" 8 to reflect
the mandate of Pope. The amended California statute requires the
personal representative to give actual notice to a creditor of whom he
has knowledge. 1 9 A personal representative has knowledge of a cred-
itor if he is aware that the creditor demanded payment from the dece-
dent or the estate. 2 ° The official comments to the legislation state
that the personal representative must have actual notice of a creditor
before a duty is imposed on the personal representative to notify the
creditor. However, the personal representative may not willfully ig-
nore information that would likely impart notice of a creditor.' 2 ' The
personal representative is only required to notify creditors who have
made their claims known. There is a provision absolving the personal
representative or attorney from liability if, in good faith, he fails to
give notice to a creditor. 122 Liability, if any, rests with the estate.123
Nevada amended its notice provision after the Moseley deci-
sion. 124 Michigan 125 and West Virginia 126 statutes requiring actual
notice to estate creditors predated the Moseley decision. Connecti-
cut's statute127 provides for publication notice and such other notice
as the court deems necessary. The remaining forty-three states have
publication notice statutes much like the one struck down by the Pope
115. Id.
116. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1347.
117. Id
118. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1-21541 (West Supp. 1988).
119. CAL. PROB. CODE § 9050(a) (West Supp. 1988).
120. Id.
121. Law Revision Commission Comment to CAL. PROB. CODE § 9050. For example, the
personal representative may not refuse to inspect a file of the decedent marked "unpaid bills."
122. CAL. PROB. CODE § 9053(b) (West Supp. 1988).
123. Id.
124. NEV. REV. STAT. § 155.020(4) (Michie Supp. 1987).
125. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.32(b) (1980). See also Note, Requirements of Notice
in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1270 (1957).
126. W. VA. CODE § 44-2-4 (1982).
127. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-205(a) (1981).
1988-89] 613
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:603
decision. 128
Many questions remain unanswered after Pope, and it is unclear
whether a statute such as California's 129 fully satisfies the Pope due
process requirements. Pope does not state whether actual knowledge
of the decedent's death is equivalent to actual notice that the non-
claim statute has been triggered.130 Nor does it explain whether ac-
tual knowledge that an estate is being administered satisfies the due
process requirement of actual notice.
Particularly troublesome is the lack of guidance as to what con-
stitutes "reasonably diligent"' 31 efforts. The Court refers to its Men-
nonite standard of reasonable diligence. 132 However, Mennonite dealt
with notice to mortgagees who are ascertainable from public records.
Certainly that is an easier group to identify, locate and notify than
some unknown number of estate creditors.
These are serious concerns which will trouble attorneys as they
endeavor to follow Pope and avoid estate liability from unknown cred-
itors. Perhaps the legislatures will be able to draft statutes which will
encompass all of the questions left unanswered after this decision.
128. ALA. CODE §§ 43-2-60, 61 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.450 (1985); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3801 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-12-801 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN., tit.
12 § 2101(b) (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-704(a) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.111(1)
(Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-7-92 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:3-801(a) (1985);
IDAHO CODE § 15-3-801 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 I/2, § 18-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-7-7 (Burns Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.230,
633.304 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59-2236 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 395.520 (Baldwin 1984); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3304 (West Supp. 1988); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 18-A, § 3-801 (1981); MD. ESTATES AND TRUST CODE ANN. § 7-103
(1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-801 (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-145 (Cum.
Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.033 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-3-801
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2483 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 550:10 (Supp. 1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:22-4 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-3-801 (1978); N.Y. SURR.
CT. PROC. ACT. § 1801 (1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-14-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 30.1-19-01 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.08 (Anderson 1976); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 113.155 (1983); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3162 (Purdon Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 33-18-1 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-3-801 (Law Co-op 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 30-21-13 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-306 (1984); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 294
(Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-801 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 1201 (Equity Cumm. Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-171 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 11.40.010 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 859.07 (West Supp. 1987); WYo. STAT. § 2-7-
201 (1988).
129. CAL. PROB. CODE § 9050(a) (West Supp. 1988).
130. After Pope, this is doubtful. Mr. Pope died in the hospital and the hospital's claim
was the basis of the litigation. The Court stated that although Mrs. Pope was aware that her
husband endured a long stay at the hospital, it is not clear that this awareness translates into
knowledge of the claim. Pope, 108 S. Ct. at 1348.
131. 108 S. Ct. at 1347.
132. Id. (citing Mennonite, 462 U.S. 791, 798 n.4 (1983)).
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However, to anticipate all of the possible problems flowing from Pope
will require comprehensive legislation which will be subject to inter-
pretation by the courts.
Patricia J. Heritage

